The Occupational Safety & (and) Health Act: Much Ado About Something by Gross, Marjorie E.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 3
Issue 2 Summer 1972 Article 3
1972
The Occupational Safety & (and) Health Act:
Much Ado About Something
Marjorie E. Gross
Legal staff of the OHS Review Commission
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marjorie E. Gross, The Occupational Safety & (and) Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 3 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 247 (1972).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol3/iss2/3
The Occupational Safety & Health Act:
Much Ado About Something
Marjorie E. Gross*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 1971, construction workers were excavating a wa-
ter tunnel in Port Huron, Michigan. Although the tunnel was inade-
quately ventilated allowing a build-up of methane gas concentrations,
the employees worked on. That afternoon, the methane gas caused an
explosion which resulted in the deaths of twenty-two workers.' Occu-
pational Safety and Health compliance officers from the United States
Department of Labor were on the scene within four hours. They be-
gan an investigation which led to the issuance from the federal district
court of a temporary restraining order requiring workers to remain at
least 100 feet from the tunnel.2 On September 24, 1971, a Philadel-
phia firm was operating without the protection of several common safe-
ty practices such as guards around floor and wall openings, sufficient
emergency exits, and portable fire extinguishers. When a Labor De-
partment investigator came to inspect the premises, he pointed out the
safety hazards and directed the employer to remedy them. In both
these cases, the Department of Labor became involved. In the first
case, Department inspectors reached the scene after the accident oc-
curred and ordered changes to prevent similar occurrences in the fu-
ture. In the second case, corrective measures were taken before a dan-
gerous situation caused actual physical injuries. It is impossible to say
whether lives or limbs were actually saved. However, the end result
* Miss Gross has been on the legal staff of the Occupational Health and
Safety Review Commission since its creation in 1971.
1. See, O.S.H. Rep. 695 (Current Report, Dec. 30, 1971).
2. Id.
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was that the workers were not as vulnerable to occupational injury
when the Labor Department inspector left.
II. HISTORY
A year ago, there were no Labor Department personnel whose duty
was to inspect for conditions dangerous to occupational safety and
health. Before 1968, the concept was practically unheard of. In the
1930's Congress had decided that working could be hazardous to the
lives, health, and development of children.' It therefore passed laws
restricting the employment of the young.4 In the 1960's, legislators
began to realize that employment could be equally as hazardous for
adults: 5 each year, more than 14,500 workers are killed by industrial
accidents;6 nearly 2.5 million are disabled; 7 and approximately 390,
000 are victims of occupational disease.8 These figures describe an
3. During the Eighteenth Century, many state laws regulating employment in
coal mines were held to be constitutional. See, Holders v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,
393-95 (1897). The Bureau of Mines was established in the Department of the
Interior in 1910; and in 1914, the predecessor of the Occupational Health Division
in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was formed. See, BNA, THE
JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, 15-16 (1970).
4. In 1916, Congress made its first attempt "to keep the arteries of commerce
free from pollution by the sweat of child labor." Lenroot v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 52 F. Supp. 142, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). See, 39 Stat. 675, ch. 432
(1916). Although this law was declared unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), and subsequent attempts to regulate child labor were also de-
clared unconstitutional, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Congress kept trying. The
child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 were the first child
labor regulations to be upheld. See, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (1961), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1947). The
Labor Department has traditionally prohibited the employment of most minors in
particularly hazardous occupations. See, i.e., Child Labor Regulations, Order No. 2,
reprinted in Lenroot v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 F. Supp. 142, 145-46, n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1943).
5. Actually, Congress recognized the need for minimum safety and health
standards long before the 1960's. However, the legislators either thought the extent of
their authority to promulgate such standards was limited or feared the reactions of
businessmen forced to make capital outlays to improve working conditions. Thus, the
Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, covering employees of government contractors prohibited
the federal government from purchasing supplies or equipment manufactured "under
working conditions which are unsanitary or hazardous or dangerous to the health and
safety of employees .... ." 41 U.S.C. § 35(e). The conditions themselves, however,
were not prohibited. But see, n.30, infra. More specific safety and health provisions
have been written into the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1958), the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act,
30 U.S.C. §§ 801, 811 (1969), and the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2021 (1959). Nevertheless, the total number of workers covered by all these laws
was an insignificant proportion of the 75 to 80 million jobholders in America.
6. 116 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1970) (Remarks of Secretary of Labor
Schultze) cited in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
7. Id.
8. See, H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970). But see
nn. 49 and 50, infra and accompanying text.
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unfortunate by-product of our industrial progress. They represent
what Senator Jacob Javits of New York has called our "industrial
carnage."9  In light of such statistics Congress decided to pass an oc-
cupational safety and health act in 1970.
Support for a bill had not been unanimous. Some critics claimed
that worker carelessness is the greatest cause of accidents, and the
preaching of accident prevention, rather than the institution of safety
and health standards for machinery and the work environment, is the
only way to eliminate work injuries. The facts show, however, that a
combination of safety precautions and safety consciousness is most ef-
fective in reducing casualties. For example, the National Safety Coun-
cil, a large private safety organization which is composed of employers
in all fields who have pledged to abide by recognized industrial safety
standards, has achieved remarkable success in reducing accidents. By
using such recognized industrial safety measures as fire prevention,
safety guards for machinery, adequate lighting and good housekeep-
ing, Safety Council members in manufacturing industries managed to
log only 5.3 disabling injuries per million employee hours worked in
1968, while non-member employers amassed an overall rate of 17.9."°
Moreover, existent federal safety legislation had proved quite effective.
For instance, after ten years of enforcement of the Maritime Safety
Act," accident frequency rates had dropped 53 percent for longshore-
men 12 and 41 percent for shipyard workers.'
With such statistics as a motivating force, the time was ripe in early
1970 for action in the field of safety and health. There was no dispute
that a strong federal occupational health and safety program was ne-
cessary to achieve a diminution in industrial accidents. Private indus-
try and state regulation were not doing an adequate job of insuring
health and safety in the workplace. Such a federal program was the
kind of legislation most Congressmen find easy to support. After all,
most voting constituents are workers; and what could be more appeal-
ing than worker health, or more desirable than safety on the job?
There was also no dispute that the federal program should include
9. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1970) (Individual views of
Senator Javits).
10. National Safety Council, ACCIDENT FACTS (1970).
11. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 941 (1958).
12. National Association of Manufacturers, Proceedings of an Industry/Govern-
ment National Teleconference on the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 10.
13. Id.
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promulgation and enforcement of federal standards, and substantial
aid to those states willing to operate an occupational health and safety
program which would meet the federal standards. Nevertheless, there
was such a great controversy over the provisions of the bill that many
began to dispair of its passage.14
The controversy was centered upon two competing bills pending be-
fore the Congress. The first, known as the Steiger bill, 15 supported
mainly by Republicans, was based on President Nixon's Special Mes-
sage to Congress on Occupational Safety and Health. 6 Its salient fea-
tures included promulgation of safety and health standards by an inde-
pendent board; 17 inspection for compliance by the Secretary of La-
bor;18 and adjudication of alleged violations by an independent com-
mission. 19 The competing bill, the Daniels bill, 20 with solid support
from organized labor, placed complete responsibility in the field of oc-
cupational safety and health with the Secretary of Labor.2' Under this
version, the Secretary would set standards,22 inspect for compliance,23
and adjudicate all violations. 4
In the conference committee, most of the differences between the
bills were resolved. The key issue which remained, and the issue
which polarized organized labor and the Administration (and labor
and management) was the role of the Secretary of Labor under the
program. The question basically became whether the Secretary should,
in addition to his functions as prosecutor, be given the power to pro-
mulgate standards and adjudicate enforcement cases. The Daniels
bill gave the Secretary all these powers, while the Administration bill
separated them by giving the quasi-legislative power to promulgate
standards to a five-man board, and the quasi-judicial power to adjudi-
14. See, Stalling on Job Safety, Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1970, § A at 18, col. 1;
Deadlock on Job Safety, New York Times, Sept. 28, 1970, at 40, col. 1.
15. The House bill, H.R. 19200, was popularly known as the Steiger-Sikes substi-
tute bill. Steiger's co-sponsor was Congressman Robert Sikes (D-Fla.). The same
bill in the senate was S.4404.
16. Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Occupational Safety and
Health (Aug. 6, 1969), PuBLIC PAPERs OF Tim PsSIDmENT, 617 (1969).
17. H.R. 19200 § 6, 8; S. 4404 § 6, 8.
18. H.R. 19200 9H 9, 10; S. 4404 §§ 9, 10.
19. H.R. 19200 § 11;S. 4404 § 11.
20. H.R. 16785 was identified principally with Congressman Dominick Daniels.
S. 2193 was introduced by Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey.
21. The AFL-CIO was a particularly strong supporter. See Perlman, LAMD-
MARK JOB SAFETY LAW WiNs FiNAL CoNGRESS OKAY, AFL-CIO News, Dec. 19,
1970, at 1, col. 4.
22. H.R. 16785 §§ 6-7; S. 2193, as reported with amendment, § 6.
23. H.R. 16785 § 9; S. 2193 § 8(a).
24. H.R. 16785 § 11; S. 2193 § 10(c). The unions undoubtedly thought they
would be more influencial with the Secretary of Labor than with a quasi-judicial
commission.
250
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cate to an independent three-man panel. The rationale for a review
board was expressed by Senator Javits:
[I]n light of over 30 years of utterly dismal performance by the
Department of Labor of its safety and health responsibilities under
the Walsh-Healey Act, labor has little reason to expect or business
any reason to fear, overly energetic administration of this Act by
the Secretary of Labor or disregard by him of the legitimate con-
cerns of business . . . . Conversely, our experience with multi-
member administrative agencies [e.g. the National Labor Rela-
tions Board], especially in the area of quasi-judicial adjudication,
has been neither so uniformly bad nor so uniformly good, or favor-
able to business, as compared to our experience with administra-
tion by cabinet-level officials, that we can assume that the use of
such an agency would seriously weaken. . this legislation. Cab-
inet-level officials are, it is true, more sensitive to political influ-
ences, and can be held accountable for the failure of their De-
partments, but political influences are, at best, a two-edged sword,
and completely improper, in any event, where adjudication is con-
cerned. 25
Although the differences often seemed irreconcilable, sentiment was
strong for passage of effective legislation during the 91st Congress.
During the lame duck session convened on November 16, 1970, Wis-
consin Congressman William Steiger led a successful drive to persuade
the House to adopt the Nixon Administration bill rather than the Com-
mittee-supported Daniels Bill.2 Meanwhile, in the Senate, Jacob Ja-
vits managed to amend the labor-backed Williams bill to make it more
palatable to the Administration. 27  The differences between the two
bills were ironed out in conference committee-the Secretary of Labor
was given the power to promulgate standards, but a newly-created
three-man panel, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion, was given the power of judicial review. In a display of bi-parti-
san unity, the result was labeled the Williams-Steiger Act. President
Nixon announced his satisfaction at the signing ceremony and com-
mented that the bill attained the goal the Administration had hoped to
reach and would effectively decrease occurrences of work-related in-
juries.2 8
25. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5219 (1970). (Individual views of
Senator Javits).
26. The Steiger substitute bill was passed by a teller vote of 185-114, and then
by a roll call vote of 220-172. 116 Cong. Rec. 10701 (1970).
27. See Amendment No. 1061, 116 Cong. Rec. 18338 (1970). This amendment
in effect created the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. At the time,
however, this independent review body was termed a panel.
28. See, 7 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 5.
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III. COVERAGE
Many federal laws, despite the good intentions of their sponsors,
are weakened in effectiveness because of their limited scope. The
first federal minimum wage laws, for instance, were restricted to em-
ployees on federally funded projects.2 9 Thus their impact was felt in
only a narrow segment of the economy. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, on the other hand, strives for maximum effective-
ness by covering virtually every man and woman who is employed in
the United States. Congress determined that work-related personal in-
jury and illness impose a substantial burden upon interstate com-
merce." ° It therefore declared its policy to be "to assure [to] every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions."'" The Act applies to all employment performed in a busi-
ness affecting commerce among the States. Thus jurisdiction under
the Act is not difficult to attain. The only workers not protected by
the new law are employees whose jobs are covered by other federal
safety legislation, such as that regulating coal miners32 and atomic en-
ergy,33 and local and state employees. 34  Consequently, the rights, du-
ties and liabilities of most employers and employees are now defined
by federal safety and health legislation. 5
IV. STANDARDS
Standard-setting authority under the Act is the province of the Sec-
retary of Labor.36 Only the general duty standard is set out in the Act
itself. All other standards are to be promulgated, modified or revoked by
the Secretary under detailed procedures which are intended to provide
notice and opportunity for hearings to all employers affected.
The general duty clause admonishes employers to furnish to their
employees a workplace which is free from recognized hazards which
29. See, e.g., Davis Bacon Act, as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 53726a (1964), Walsh-
Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35. Although the Public Contracts Act
was passed in 1936, no safety and health standards were promulgated under it until
1960. There have been several amendments to the standards since that time. .41
C.F.R. § 50-204 (1970).
30. See, Congressional Findings and Purpose, 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 (1971).
31. See, 29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (1971).
32. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. H§ 801, 811.
33. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2021.
34. 29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(2), (4) (1971).
35. The need for protection is, of course, different for different occupations. The
incidence of job safety and health hazards is less frequent in non-manufacturing firms
than in manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, each non-manufacturing employer
must provide his employees with a safe work place and must record all accidents
which occur.
36. 29 U.S.C.A. § 655 (1971).
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cause or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. The sec-
tion also orders employers and employees to comply with standards,
rules, regulations and orders issued for employees' protection.3 7
Skeptics who find the language of this section vacuous and high-sound-
ing should take note that of the first sixty cases filed before the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission, more than half were
based on alleged violations of the general duty clause. 38
This general duty provision was added because Congress recog-
nized that precise standards to cover every conceivable situation would
not always exist. Any effective federal program must cover situations
where employees might be killed or injured on the job simply because
there was no specific standard applicable to a recognized hazard.
The conference committee concluded that a general duty standard is
based on sound and reasonable policy and common law principles.
Under recognized principles of common law, individuals are obliged to
refrain from actions which cause harm to others. Courts refer to this
as a general duty of care to others, and statutes usually increase or
modify this duty. With these principles as a guide, employers are
equally bound by this general and common law duty to cause no ad-
verse effects to their employees during the course of employment.
Employers have primary control of the work environment and should
insure that safe and healthful conditions exist. The general duty sec-
tion, in providing that employers must furnish employment "which is
free from recognized hazards so as to provide safe and healthful work-
ing conditions," merely restates that each employer should furnish this
degree of care.39 The general duty clause is not a general substitute
for reliance on standards, but simply enables the Secretary of Labor to
37. 29 U.S.C.A. § 654:
(a) Each employer-
(1) Shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees;
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated un-
der this Act.
(b) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health standards and
all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this Act which are applicable to
his own actions and conduct.
See discussion pt. VII, infra.
38. The remaining suits alleged violations of the initial standards package of
May 29, 1971.
39. In addition to this common law duty, there is a long-established statutory
precedent in both federal and state law to require employers to provide a safe and
healthful place of employment. Over 36 states have provisions of this type, and. at
least 3 federal laws contain similar provisions, including the Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act, the Service Contract Act, and The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act.
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insure the protection of employees who are working under special cir-
cumstances for which no standard has yet been adopted.
The second part of the general duty provision orders employees to
comply with standards set up for their. protection. Congress was
aware that the purposes of this Act could not be totally achieved with-
out the fullest cooperation of affected employees, therefore an obliga-
tion was placed upon each employee to comply with the requirements
of the Act. However, this duty of the employee was not intended to
diminish the employer's responsibility to comply. Final responsibility
for compliance with the requirements of this Act remains with the em-
ployer.
The Act goes on to authorize the promulgation of three kinds of
standards: interim, permanent, and emergency. The standards cur-
rently in force are interim standards. They were derived from safety
standards already utilized by enlightened employers for the protection
of their workers. Some, known as national consensus standards, were
developed by the American National Standards Institute and the Na-
tional Fire Protection Association. Others, known as established fed-
eral standards, were already in force on federally funded projects such
as construction under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act4° and
shipping under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act."' Although the Act gave the Secretary of Labor two years to
promulgate these interim standards, Secretary Hodgson announced an
initial package of standards covering most industries soon after the Act
became effective.42 Employers affected by these standards, however,
were given a 90-day grace period in order to come into compliance vol-
untarily.43
A second type of standard provided for under the Act is the per-
manent standard, which may be either a revised old standard or a new-
ly promulgated standard. Permanent standards may be created in sev-
eral ways. Often, they are suggested by interested persons, unions, or
nationally recognized standard-setting organizations, the National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health, a state or local government, or
the Secretaries of Labor or Health, Education and Welfare. Once a
40. 41 U.S.C. § 35(e).
41. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 941.
42. See, 36 Fed. Reg. 10466-714 (1971).
43. The standards became effective on the date of publication for those employees
already covered by similar standards issued under the Walsh-Healey Act and similar
laws. The grace period delayed the effective date for all other employers until
August 29, 1971.
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suggestion has been made, the Secretary of Labor may appoint an ad-
visory committee to analyze it and to recommend appropriate action.
On the other hand, he may dispense with the committee and publish
the proposal immediately in the Federal Register. However, if a new
permanent standard is substantially different from an existing national
consensus standard, he must publish in the Federal Register a state-
ment of the reasons why the rule adopted will better effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act." Interested parties have 30 days during which to
comment or to request a public hearing. Within 60 days after a hear-
ing has been held, the Secretary issues the standard, although he may
delay the effective date if he feels that employers will need time to
comply. 5
Where the Secretary has not granted a delay in the effective date of
a standard to an entire industry, an individual employer may neverthe-
less apply for temporary variances, after notifying his employees that
they may participate in a hearing on whether the variance should be
granted. In addition, the employer must show by a preponderance of
evidence that
The conditions, practices, means, methods, operations or processes
used . . . by an employer will provide employment and places of
employment . . . which are as safe and healthful [under the vari-
ance] as those which would prevail if he had complied with the
standard. 46
This procedure should help assure that new standards will be as small
a burden as possible to the individual employers who have special
problems which prevent them from complying as quickly as other em-
ployers in the same industry, but at the same time will provide ade-
quate protection for employees.
Emergency standards, the last type provided for in the Act, apply
when the Secretary determines: (A) that employees are exposed to
grave danger from toxic substances or physically dangerous agents or
from newly discovered hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard
is necessary to protect employees from such danger. 7
In order to protect the lives and health of workers in dangerous
working conditions, the Secretary must move quickly to institute spe-
cial safety and health standards without regard to the time-consuming
permanent standard-setting procedure. Nevertheless, in order to en-
44. 29 U.S.C.A. § 655(b)(8) (1971).
45. 29 U.S.C.A. § 655(b)(4) (1971).
46. 29 U.S.C.A. § 655(d) (1971).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. § 655(c)(1) (1971).
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sure due process and maximum fairness to employers, as soon as emer-
gency temporary standards are published the Secretary must begin the
regular formal standard-setting procedure.
When any new standard is published, an employer who feels he has
been adversely affected thereby may challenge it in the courts by seek-
ing judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit
where he resides or has his principal place of business.4"
In addition to the general duty clause and the standard-setting pro-
visions, another of the most important provisions of the Act, and the
one which affects the most American businesses, is the record-keeping
requirement. During deliberations prior to the passage of the new
law, the inadequacy of job injury statistics was frequently cited as a
major problem in the health and safety field. Critics claimed that be-
cause of the lack of a uniform recording and reporting system, it was
almost impossible to get an accurate picture of the scope and serious-
ness of the safety and health problem in America and to channel re-
sources into the areas needing the greatest improvements. The major
source of injury statistics, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey of
Work Injury, suffered not only from inadequate funding, but also from
a lack of trained researchers and a reporting universe whose represent-
ativeness was highly suspect. One source estimated that there could
have been an absolute error of eight percent in the total number of in-
juries reported;4 9 another study estimated a discrepancy of as much as
ten percent due to the differences in definitions used to describe in-
juries.50 For example, some employers never counted non-disabling in-
juries, although some seemingly harmless injuries undoubtedly later
became disabling. Often, an injured employee was transferred to a
less demanding job so that all employees would still be working and
the firm's record of employment safety would remain untarnished. In
a study done for the Department of Labor, it was estimated that for
every disabling injury reported, ten serious injuries went unrecorded.5
Although accurate injury statistics cannot prevent accidents, they
can help to decrease injuries by indicating special problem areas where
48. 29 U.S.C.A. § 655(f) (1971).
49. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR FINAL REPORT, AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATISTICS PROGRAM, pt. I, at 13. This is the so-called Gordon
Report of September 30, 1970, prepared under a Department of Labor contract by
Jerome B. Gordon, Allan Akman and Michael Brooks; J. GORDON, A. AKMAN,
AND M. BROOKS, AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL SAFETY STATISTICS PROGRAM,
(Praeger ed. 1971).
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
256
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the accident rate is significantly above national or industry norms.12
Once statisticians have an accurate breakdown of the incidence of oc-
cupational injuries and diseases, their findings can be used by industrial
hygienists to institute special safety programs for worker groups with
especially high injury rates, and by engineers and medical scientists to
spot areas where design improvements are needed to prevent accidents
and diseases in the future. Just such a breakdown has been provided
by the comprehensive record-keeping requirements which are an inte-
gral part of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Under
these provisions, employers are required to maintain records of all dis-
abling, serious or significant injuries and occupational illnesses, wheth-
er or not they require loss of work time.13  Even minor injuries must
be recorded if they involve loss of consciousness, medical treatment
other than first aid, restriction of work or motion, or transfer to an-
other job.54 Furthermore, in order to facilitate research in the field of
occupational disease, employers may be required to record employee
exposure to potentially toxic materials or to other harmful physical
agents. 5  All these records are vital to the development of information
on the causes and prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses
and may prove to be one of the greatest contributions to the welfare of
American workers made by the Act.
V. ENFORCEMENT
No law can be truly effective without conscientious enforcement.
Government personnel must have the right of entry in order to ascer-
tain the safety and health conditions and status of compliance of any
employing establishment covered by the Act. Only in this way can an
effective national occupational safety and health program be carried
out. Responsibility for enforcing the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 is vested in the Department of Labor's Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Administration [OSHA], which operates through a net-
work of regional offices throughout the country. Each office maintains
a force of job safety inspectors who, under the supervision of an Area
52. Such statistics also form the basis of the Labor Department's "worst first"
approach to enforcement. Initial enforcement activity will be centered in the five
industries which have consistently recorded the highest accident rate in the country:
longshoring, roofing and sheet metal, meat and meat products, mobile homes and
other transportation equipment, and lumber and wood products. See 1 O.S.H. REP.
74-76 (1971), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 657, 669(a)(5), 673 (1971).
53. 29 U.S.C.C.A. § 657(c)(2) (1971).
54. Id.
55. 29 U.S.C.A. § 657(c)(3) (1971). The Department of Labor mailed record-
keeping forms to all employers covered by The Act in mid-1971. Regulations issued
in this area are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1904.
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Director, patrol the factories, farms and offices of their region. Most
inspections are made at the initiative of the inspectors in a systematic
effort to cover all the workplaces of the region. 6 Inspections, how-
ever, may also be instigated in response to a "tip" or a complaint filed
by an employee. 57
Since the law penalizes persons giving advance notice of inspections,
employers may be surprised at the safety inspector's visit.58 When the
inspector visits a workplace, he will identify himself to the person in
charge, advise him of the purpose of his visit, and begin his investiga-
tion. In order to help him on his inspection, a representative of the
employer and a representative authorized by employees must be given
an opportunity to accompany him around the workplace.59 Under ex-
isting procedures, after completing the investigation, the compliance
officer reports any violations to his Area Director, who decides whether
to issue a citation. ° Although the Conference Report accompanying
the Occupational Safety and Health Act indicates that a citation should
be issued within 72 hours after a violation has been found, 61 the Act
provides a six-month statute of limitations.6 2
Once the employer receives a citation, he must post it in a prominent
location at or near each place where a cited violation occurred. The
citation has a threefold purpose: (1) to describe with particularity
the nature of the violation; (2) to fix a reasonable time for abatement
of the cited conditions; and (3) to advise employees of their right to a
hearing on the reasonableness of the time fixed for abatement of the
violation.63 One vital piece of information not contained in the cita-
56. Although inspections are more or less systematic, there has been an emphasis
on those industries with above average injury frequency rates. See n.52, supra.
57. During the first half of fiscal year 1972, inspectors conducted investigations at
12,176 establishments employing 2,325,501 workers. Only 1,169 visits were in response
to complaints. See O.S.H. REP. 863 (Current Report, Feb. 17, 1972). Apparently
workers are more likely to complain about health problems than about safety hazards.
According to Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health
George Guenther, 60 percent of the employee complaints during the first four months
of experience under the Act related to such problems as dust, fumes, mist and radia-
tion rather than conventional safety needs such as machine guard rails. See Fishbein,
Occupational Health and Safety Letter, at 2 (Nov. 8, 1971).
58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 366(f) provides a $1,000 penalty for those convicted of giving
advance notice of inspections without authority from the Secretary of Labor or his
designees.
59. 29 U.S.C.A. § 657(e) (1971).
60. In the first five months of inspections, only 23.5 percent of all establishments
inspected were found to be in compliance. See, O.S.H. REP. 751 (Current Report,
Jan. 13, 1972). After six months' experience with inspections of 12,176 establish-
ments, 9,179 citations alleging 34,960 violations had been issued. See, O.S.H. REP.
863 (Current Report, Feb. 17, 1972).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970).
62. 29 U.S.C.A. § 658(c) (1971).
63. This notification is for the purpose of affording employees the opportunity to
protect the rights given them under § 659(c) of the Act. A hearing may be requested
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tion is the amount of the penalty proposed to be assessed against the
employer. The Act provides that such notice of proposed penalty
must be sent by registered mail within a reasonable time after comple-
tion of the inspection. 4 Presumably, the time before the penalty no-
tice is due is to be spent in weighing the factors which may be taken
into account in assessing the penalty, such as the size of the employer's
business, the gravity of the violation, the employer's good faith, and
his history of previous safety and health violations.6 5 The possible
penalties which may be imposed are severe enough to serve as a deter-
rent. A penalty of up to $1,000 can be assessed for serious or non-
serious violations which are not wilful and repeated. These are the
most common violations. However, a penalty of up to $10,000 may
be imposed for wilful and repeated violations with an additional six
months imprisonment when the violation results in the death of an em-
ployee; and up to $20,000 or imprisonment for one year, or both, for
a second or subsequent violation causing the death of an employee.
In addition, there may be an assessment of up to $1,000 a day for
each day an employer fails to correct a violation after the expiration
of the abatement period.66
Once the notice of penalty has been received, the employer has fif-
teen days in which to contest the proposed penalty, the citation upon
which it is based, or both.37  During this time employees may also
contest the amount of time allowed for abatement of the violation. 68
Such contest is accomplished through written notification of the Area
Director.69 The Labor Department then notifies the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission to place the action on the Re-
view Commission docket. If no contest is made, the citation and pro-
posed penalty are deemed to be final and are not subject to review by
any court or agency. 0
by notifying the Area Director of an objection to the abatement time within 15
working days of the issuance of the citation.
64. 29 U.S.C.A. § 659(b) (1971).
65. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(j) (1971).
66. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)-(e) (1971). After the first six months of inspections,
covering 12,176 establishments, a total of $725,169 in penalties had been proposed.
See O.S.H. REP. 863 (Current Report, Feb. 17, 1972).
67. 29 U.S.C.A. § 659(a) (1971).
68. See n.63, supra.
69. Ideally, at this stage settlement talks could begin between the employer and the
Secretary of Labor. Because of the time pressures imposed by the procedural rules of
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission which require speedy com-
mencement of a hearing, any talk of settlement has been postponed until later in
the proceeding.
70. 29 U.S.C.A. § 659(a). One word of caution at this point. The Commission
has recently adopted Rules of Procedure which make contesting a case somewhat more
complex than the statutory provisions outlined above. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.
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VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Review of the citation and penalty is made by the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission. The Review Commission is a
new federal agency created by the Act. It is an autonomous agency
like the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, and a number of other administrative bodies, 71 but it has no reg-
ulatory authority. Rather, its powers are strictly quasi-judicial.7 2  In
fact, next to the Tax Court of the United States and the United States
Court of Military Appeals, it is the closest approximation to a court
existing in the executive branch.
It is the duty of the Review Commission to grant hearings. After
the Review Commission receives a notice of contest from the Labor De-
partment's Area Director, the case is docketed and referred to a hear-
ing examiner. The examiner holds a formal hearing at or near the
site of the alleged violation to determine whether a violation in fact
existed and to fix the amount of penalty to be assessed. 73  The decision
of the hearing examiner may become the final order of the Commission
unless within thirty days after it is rendered, one of the three Commis-
sioners directs that the case be heard by the Commission itself. 74 This
automatic finality procedure is a rather unique provision common to
federal agencies with quasi-judicial authority. The Commission mem-
bers need not act affirmatively to adopt the report of a Hearing Exam-
iner as their own; it will become so with the passage of time unless a
member of the Commission orders otherwise.7 5  If a member of the
Review Commission directs that a hearing examiner's report be re-
71. See, 116 Cong. Reg. 18339 (1970) (remarks of Senator Javits: "It creates
a review commission with all complaints referred to it by the Secretary and which will
have the same type of authority that the Federal Trade Commission exercises ...
This is an autonomous, independent commission which, without regard to the Secre-
tary, can find for or against him on the basis of individual complaints.").
72. Its only function, according to the Act, is to afford hearings in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 554.
73. The figure proposed by the Labor Department and named in the citation is
merely a suggestion. The Review Commission Hearing Examiner may affirm it or
modify it in conformance with the requirements of the Act. The Commissioners may
also change the penalty when they review a case. See, 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(j)
(1971).
74. 29 U.S.C.A. § 659 (1971). See also, 29 C.F.R. § 2200, 42(c)(d)(1); 116
Cong. Rec. 18339 (1970). (Remarks of Senator Javits: "[T]his amendment provides
that if the hearing examiner's report is not contested and the Commission does not
order it reviewed, it becomes final . . .- a very quick way of dealing with relatively
minor situations.").
75. In its first seven months of operation, the Commission received a total of 358
cases. Eighty-two were withdrawn or disposed of on procedural grounds; five were
decided after hearing and allowed to become final. Review of the Hearing Exami-
ner's decision was directed by Commission members in ten cases. See O.S.H. REP.
742 (Current Report, Jan. 6, 1972).
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viewed, the parties to the case are notified and are given an opportunity
to file briefs and exceptions to the hearing examiner's report. The
Commission thereafter issues its decision. Another unique provision
makes a final order of the Review Commission self-enforcing unless
stayed by the Court of Appeals. 6 Otherwise, the appeal procedure
from the Review Commission follows fairly familiar lines. Appeals
go the United States Court of Appeals and must be filed within sixty
days of the Commission's final order.77
The Commission's caseload has risen sharply during its short exist-
ence. In October, 1971, the first month in which the temporary
standards became applicable to most businesses, 3 percent of all cita-
tions were contested to the Commission. In January of 1972-just
three months later-the percentage of cases appealed had doubled to
6 percent. 8 These cases will raise many questions concerning the Act
and its application. They will require careful consideration, for these
cases will provide precedent for future administration of the Act.
VII. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT
As previously mentioned, many of the cases which have come before
the Review Commission have been based on the general duty clause.
Undoubtedly one of the most complicated tasks presently before the
Review Commission is to define this general duty section. Thirty cases
have already been brought under the clause. Although many of these
were settled after violation of the clause was charged and citations is-
sued, several cases remain, raising issues which run the gamut from the
"duty of due care" of traditional tort law to interpetation of a legisla-
tive history which is more than a little vague. The problem simply
phrased is: What constitutes employment and a place of employment
free from recognized hazards causing or likely to cause death or serious
physical harm?
Despite the length of the hearings and debates on the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, there was surprisingly little discussion
of the meaning of the general duty clause which would be helpful to
the resolution of individual cases. Doubtless many legislators thought
the language of the provision was self-explanatory. Neither of the
original Occupational Safety and Health bills, H.R. 3809 (introduced
by Congressman O'Hara) or S. 2193 (Williams, Kennedy, Mondale,
76. 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(a) (1971).
77. Id.
78. The number of inspections also increased during this period.
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and Yarborough) contained a general duty clause as such although
each was directed toward the establishment of safe and healthful em-
ployment. The first Administration proposals, H.R. 13373 and S.
2788, provided that employers should furnish "employment and a place
of employment which are safe and healthful as prescribed by . . .
standards promulgated by the National Occupational Safety and Health
Board"-a new body created by the Act. The bill eventually adopted
by the Senate subcommittee was an amended version of S. 2193."
This bill, reported on October 6 and passed by the full Senate on
November 17, provided for workplaces "free from recognized hazards
so as to provide safe and healthful working conditions."
H.R. 16785 was also sponsored by Democrats." That bill, uniformly
disliked by Republicans on the Committee, provided in section 5a(1)
that "[e]ach employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment
and a place of employment which is safe and healthful." The outcry
against the vague standard "safe and healthful" was overwhelming."'
Opponents of the bill referred to the clause as a "sweeping general
requirement" couched in "language . . . so broad, general and vague
as to defy practical interpretation let alone responsible enforcement.8 2
The Republican alternative, H.R. 19200, offered by Congressmen
Steiger and Sikes on September 29, 1970, forbade "any hazards which
are readily apparent and are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm." The counterpart bill in the Senate (S. 4404)
contained a similar provision. Even this language had problems in
interpretation. It is possible that a hazard readily apparent to a safety
expert might not be readily apparent to a layman or ordinary worker;
however the readily apparent language was more specific than the
Committee version. At the end of November, when dissatisfaction with
the House Committee bill ran high, Congressman Daniels made an un-
successful last ditch effort to prevent passage of the Steiger-Sikes Amend-
ment by making several amendments to H.R. 16785, including a change
in the general duty clause. Daniels feared that the Steiger-Sikes "readily
apparent" language meant "apparent without investigation,"' 3 and that
79. S. 2193 introduced by Senators Williams, Kennedy, Mondale, Yarborough, Hart
and Tydings.
80. H.R. 16785, the Daniels bill, adopted by the House Committee on Labor
and Education.
81. 116 Cong. Rec. H. 10615 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Smith); 116 Cong. Rec. H.10691 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Robison).
82. 116 Cong. Rec. H.10616 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Anderson).
83. 116 Cong. Rec. H.10625 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970).
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such an interpretation might discourage thorough investigation by em-
ployers. This would provide an escape mechanism for employers who
were ill-informed about safety matters. Daniels proposed to require
employers to furnish "employment and a place of employment free
from recognized hazards so as to provide safe and healthful working
conditions"-language which was eventually adopted by the conference
committee.
It is obvious by the number of cases filed that the general duty
clause is important, and it becomes more important in light of the con-
fusion surrounding its interpretation. Although most citations were
given before the comprehensive standards took effect, several have
been given since that time. From the legislative history it is reasonably
certain that the clause was intended to have a practical meaning."'
However, the obvious problem still remains: What does it mean and
how should it be applied to the cases? What is a recognized hazard?
Who is to do the recognizing-the employer, the employees, the
government, or perhaps the ordinary prudent man? Neither the bill
nor the speeches on the floor of Congress give much explanation.
The problems in defining "recognized hazard" are immediately ap-
parent. The word "recognize" can mean "to perceive clearly something
previously known." This may mean that a recognized hazard is a con-
dition known to be hazardous which is readily apparent to the senses.
Support for this proposition is found in a statement of Congressman
Steiger commenting on the conference committee report. He said:
[Recognized] hazards are the type that can readily be detected on
the basis of the basic human senses. Hazards which require tech-
nical or testing devices to detect them are not intended to be within
the scope of the general duty requirement."5
This interpretation is supported by a statement of Senator Saxbe that
recognized hazard is "something that would be recognized by all peo-
ple."8 6
An alternative meaning of "recognized" is "to acknowledge formal-
ly," or "to acknowledge de facto existence." This definition implies
that a hazard is "recognized" only when it has gone through some for-
84. It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that every word and clause of
a statute must be given effect, Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74
Utah 102, 277 P. 206 (1929), BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AN ) INTERPRETATION OF LAWS,
§ 53 (2d ed. 1911).
85. 116 Cong. Rec. H.42204 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Steiger).
86. 116 Cong. Rec. S 17967 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970) (remarks of Senator Saxbe).
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mal recognition procedure. Support for the proposition that there
must be some kind of formal recognition, or at least that recognition is
not by the ordinary prudent observer through the senses, is found in
the description given by Congressman Daniels of his amendments to
H.R. 16785. In his explanation, Congressman Daniels said,
"A recognized hazard is a condition that is known to be hazardous,
and is known taking into account the standard of knowledge in the
industry. In other words, [it] is a matter for objective determina-
tion; it does not depend on whether the particular employer is
aware of it."'s7
Congressman Daniels may have intended the clause to require expert
testimony to prove a violation.
If the decision as to hazardousness is made -using an objective in-
terpretation rather than the subjective opinion of the employee on the
job, it can be argued that the standard has been narrowed to the detri-
ment of the employee. However, this interpretation, in fact, makes the
standard broader than the "readily apparent" interpretation, since an
expert who would recognize an inherent danger not visible to the un-
trained eye would undoubtedly recognize as hazardous a readily ap-
parent danger. This proposition is consistent with the overall policy of
the Act of preventing job injuries and providing inherently safe work-
places.
It is impossible to predict how these problems will be solved. I am
sure that the Review Commission and the federal courts of appeal will
have much to say concerning the meaning of the general duty clause.
It is interesting to note, however, what has been said about the stand-
ard in the recent past by the Review Commission judges. In Hodg-
son v. Republic Creosoting Co.88 respondent was charged with a viola-
tion of the general duty clause when an employee was killed in a work
accident. Republic was engaged in the purchase of recently cut rail-
road ties which it usually sold to the Penn Central Railroad. Ties re-
ceived at the firm's yard were loaded on flatbed trucks by the sellers
87. 116 Cong. Rec. H.10625 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970) (emphasis added). The
Department of Labor has also adopted an objective standard:
A hazard is "recognized" if it is a condition that is (a) of common knowledge of
general recognition in the particular industry in which it occurs and (b) detectable(1) by means of the senses (sight, smell, touch and hearing), or (2) is of such
wide general recognition in the industry that even if it is not detectable by means of
the senses, there are generally known and accepted tests for its existence to the em-
ployer. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRA-
TION, COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL, 68 (CCH ed. 1972).
88. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Case No. 22 [Hereinafter
cited OSHRC].
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and were secured to the trucks by chains. A portion of each truckload
contained packages of ties containing up to 45 ties weighing from 150
to 235 pounds, bound together by one steel band about 1% inches
wide. The customary procedure in unloading trucks was for an em-
ployee to move a forklift under the first package to prevent ties from
falling from the truck when employees were engaged in the unloading
process. Then the band around the pile would be cut. On the day of
the accident, three employees were directed to unload a truck. One,
who had been working at the unloading yard for only four days, took
an ax from the unloader without being ordered to do so. Without in-
forming anyone of what he intended to do, he cut the band binding a
package on the truck. As he turned to walk away, five ties fell from
the truck, fatally injuring him. The employer was cited under the gen-
eral duty clause89 based on allegations that the decedent had been
given no safety instructions other than an admonition to be careful, al-
though he had advised the firm of his inexperience in handling lumber.
The Review Commission judge who heard the case found that the
work of unloading, stacking and sorting green railroad ties was inher-
ently dangerous because of the weight of the material handled. He
found that Republic took no effective steps, either in providing ade-
quate safety regulations or instructions, or adequate supervision of its
employees, to avoid or prevent the hazardous condition which existed
at its workplace. Although it might be argued that the employee's
death was caused by his own negligence, the judge declared that:
"Respondent cannot divest itself of responsibility for the viola-
tion charged . . . by alleging that the deceased employee's mis-
conduct . .. caused the fatal injuries. The final responsibility
for violations of the Act rests with the employer and the Act
imposes upon the employer the responsibility to take steps nec-
essary to provide a place of employment free from recognized haz-
ards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to its employees. The Respondent here failed to provide ade-
quate supervision of its employees which created the hazardous
condition herein found to exist."90
This case raises several interesting issues: Can safety training make
the difference between a safe and a hazardous workplace? Can em-
ployment which is inherently hazardous be made safe through safety
89. One of the purposes of the general duty clause is to provide a basis for cita-
tions where no specific standards cover the field. See text at p. 252 supra. This pur-
pose was specifically adopted by The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
as part of its enforcement policy. See COMPLIANCE OPERAnONS MANUAL, supra note
87 at 66.
90. OSHRC Case No. 22 at 21.
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instruction? Is every accident or death in the workplace the result of
a violation of the general duty provision or of a specific standard?
Must final responsibility for injury under the Act rest with the em-
ployer, or does the employer's duty of care cease after he has complied
with a specific level of protection? Indeed, can there be any rigid
standard at all, considering the purpose of the Act of making the Amer-
ican workplace "as safe and as healthful as human intelligence and
good will can make it"?91 Must there be an ad hoc determination in
every case?
In Hodgson v. Norman Bratcher Co. 2 respondent was a painting
contractor charged with painting certain buildings at an Army instal-
lation. Although he observed that some buildings had signs warning
"Danger High Voltage," he determined that his equipment-an assort-
ment of wooden and aluminum ladders and scaffolding-was adequate
for the job. His workmen, after struggling for some time to extend a
paint-encrusted aluminum ladder, raised it into the highest of three
power lines running in front of the building, electrocuting two painters
and resulting in the death of one. Respondent conceded that the use
of metal ladders where they might come into contact with electric lines
constituted a hazardous condition. However, he argued that the risk
was so well known that only the neglect or carelessness of employees
could have produced the accident. The Review Commission judge
held that the respondent's duty of care did not end when he furnished
his employees with wooden ladders as well as metal ladders, since the
use of metal ladders near power lines is an employment likely to cause
death or serious physical harm. Is it paternalistic to think that the em-
ployees could not decide for themselves that the use of aluminum lad-
ders was hazardous? Assuming that aluminum ladders are more bene-
ficial than wooden ones in some situations, must the employer make
a determination before the start of every painting job to see whether the
use of aluminum ladders is permissible? Is safety instruction the an-
swer-so that once the employer has instructed his employees in the
tools of the trade and the possible dangers to be encountered, he is ab-
solved from responsibility where injury or death is caused by their own
negligence?
The Republic and Brachter cases do make it clear that the employer
is held to a strict standard of care under the general duty clause. The
91. 116 Cong. Rec. H.42204 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Ayres).
92. OSHRC Case No. 83.
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Brachter case indicates that this standard may not be met where the
employer merely provides general safety instructions. In addition, the
general duty clause may require the employer to take an active role in
the supervision and direction of his employees.
In a third case, Hodgson v. National Realty and Construction Co.,93
the employer was cited under the general duty clause for permitting a
foreman to stand as a passenger on the running board of a moving
piece of equipment. The employee had hopped onto the side of a
front end loader which was towing an air compressor at an excavation
site in Virginia. The loader stalled when descending a ramp, and be-
came difficult to steer. As the machine started to roll off the side of
the ramp, the foreman jumped off and was killed when the loader top-
pled over and landed on him. Although there was apparently a com-
pany policy prohibiting riding on moving equipment, and although the
decedent was a highly experienced foreman whose duties had included
enforcement of this company policy, the trial judge determined that the
duty of care imposed by the Act as to the foreman was less than that
owed to an inexperienced employee. He found that the death was not
the result of any breach of duty owed by the respondent under the
Act. Rather, it arose out of a violation of a known company safety
rule, and was therefore an unavoidable accident as far as the employer
was concerned. Even if the employer did have a lesser duty of care
to the foreman, did the company fulfill its duty by making known the
company policy? Can the employer be held ultimately responsible
even though he has done everything in his power to prevent accidents?
All these questions will come before the Review Commission within
the near future.
It will be our task to determine the meaning of the general duty
clause. It may be some small comfort to us to know that at least one
Congressman expected the process of definition to be a slow one.
As Representative Hathaway remarked during the Congressional de-
bates:
"[It has been said that] it would be up to an inspector to decide
what the general duty was. I suspose that is true; it is up to the
policeman to decide in the first instance whether or not we have
broken a law, too, but we do have resort to the courts, and we
would have resort to the courts under this bill . . . And hope-
fully, after a while, a body of law could be formulated so that later
93. OSHRC Case No. 85.
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cases would have precedents behind them, and we would be able to
exercise a fairly uniform body of law throughout the country as to
just what general duty is.''94
The beginnings of this process are being made at the Review Commis-
sion.
VIII. REMEDIAL ASPECTS OF THE LAW
In addition to the standard-setting and enforcement provisions of
the Act which are meant to diminish dangers in the workplace, the Act
also provides for methods which will eliminate and prevent harmful
conditions. A significant portion of the Act is devoted to methods
of improving job safety and health which do not involve enforcement,
rules, penalties, courts, or Labor Department inspectors. These reme-
dial aspects are designed to provide for research to aid the develop-
ment of new methods for dealing with occupational safety and health
problems, the exploration of ways to discover latent occupational dis-
eases, medical criteria to assure that no one will suffer diminished
health or life expectancy because of his job, and training programs to
increase the number and competence of personnel in the field of job
safety and health.
95
The responsibility for accomplishing these objectives is assigned to
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. His duties and com-
mensurate powers include power to conduct research, industry studies
and employee training programs. 96 To assist him in performing these
functions, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, a
new agency within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
was established by the Act.9 7  The authority vested in the Institute and
its Director extends not only to conducting research and recommend-
ing new safety and health standards,98 but also to performing any func-
tion delegated by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 99
Many believe that these remedial aspects of the law will be more posi-
tive forces in improving job safety and health than all other provisions
of the Act combined.100
94. 116 Cong. Rec. 10631 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970).
95. 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 (b) (5), (6), (7) (1971).
96. 29 U.S.C.A. § 669(a), (b) 670 (1971).
97. 29 U.S.C.A. § 671(a), (b) (1971).
98. 29 U.S.C.A. § 671(c) (1971).
99. 29 U.S.C.A. § 669(e) (1971).
100. At the signing ceremony. Labor Secretary Hodgson suggested that "Secretary[of HEW] Richardson got more of the health component into this bill than any of the
previous bills introduced of this nature. 7 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments, 5 (Jan. 4, 1971).
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IX. CONCLUSION
During the Congressional debates on the passage of the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act, several persons noted that the more than 14,500
workers who are killed by industrial accidents each year represent an
annual death total exceeding that of the Vietnam War."' 1 Congress-
men, labor unions, safety organizations and the federal government
have initiated procedures which may mean an end to endless casu-
alties on the job. Such procedures will require effective standards,
strict enforcement, and relentless research. The fight against job casu-
alties and occupational diseases is just beginning. Hopefully, we will
see a winding down and a final end to the senseless carnage of the
workplace.
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101. See 116 Cong. Rec. (daily ed, Nov. 16, 1970); U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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COMMENTARY
Not every idea of interest to the legal profession needs the traditional
structure of the lead article. This section is designed to provide a
forum for such ideas in essay form. These essays may discuss novel or
controversial ideas or they may seek to evaluate recent trends in the
law. Through the publication of these essays, the Loyola Law Journal
hopes to stimulate the development and exchange of ideas within the
legal profession.
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